BACKGROUND Despite state and federal efforts to implement medical malpractice reform, there is limited evidence on which to base policy decisions. The National Practitioner Data Bank (NPDB) offers an opportunity to evaluate the effects of previous malpractice tort reforms on malpractice payments and premiums.
INTRODUCTION
R ecent increases in malpractice premiums, exorbitant malpractice awards, and physicians' fear of litigation have been reported as factors driving rising health care costs and threatening access to medical care in the United States. 1 By no means is the United States unique; several countries have begun to see sharp rises in malpractice payments and premiums threatening malpractice insurers' solvency and patients' access to services. [2] [3] [4] [5] During each medical malpractice crisis of the past 3 decades, stakeholders have debated the causes and proposed legislative solutions. 6 Wide disparities have been documented in rates of malpractice claims fi led, average payments per claim, and maximum claim payments among states. 7 Although cost containment is only one goal of medical liability reform, it remains a major driver of policy debates.
Studies analyzing data from the crises in the 1970s and 1980s have shown that state statutory reforms, specifi cally caps on noneconomic damages and collateral source offsets, are associated with lower total payments, although some of these studies have shown mixed results. [8] [9] [10] [11] Noneconomic damage caps and limitations on time to fi le suits have been associated with lower malpractice premiums. 12 Most studies were conducted more than a decade ago, however, and were limited to samples of insurance companies. Given contemporary medical liability concerns, it is important to learn from recent experience and use more complete data to assess the associated effects of state tort reform on the state malpractice payment and premium variability that frame our current crisis. We analyzed all payments made to settle claims or satisfy malpractice judgments on behalf of physicians in the United States for the years 1999 th rough 2001 as reported to the National Practitioner Data Bank (NPDB). These dates were chosen because many states instituted reforms in the mid-1990s, and we sought to capture subsequent claims data taking into account delays in data reporting, as well as lags in application of these reforms (eg, possible delays because of appeals). We also sought to capture a period after the fi rst wave of reforms but before the second wave of reforms that occurred after 2001. We evaluated malpractice payments and medical liability premiums in relation to 10 common state tort statutes that originally were intended to curb claims. We also assessed the potential direct economic impact of implementing effective statutory reforms nationwide.
METHODS
In 1986 Congress enacted legislation to create the NPDB as a repository of medical malpractice payments and adverse actions related to limitations on licensure, clinical privileges, professional society membership, and participation in federal programs. 13 According to this legislation, malpractice carriers, hospitals, professional societies, and state licensing boards are mandated to report to the NPDB all malpractice payments made to settle claims or satisfy judgments against individual nurses, dentists, and physicians. The original intent of the databank was to improve health care by encouraging licensing boards, health care facilities, and professional societies not only to identify and discipline those who provide incompetent care, but also to limit the ability of those clinicians to change locations without making known any previous medical malpractice payment and adverse action history. 14 We analyzed the 44,913 paid medical malpractice claims reported on behalf of physicians to the NPDB between January 1999 and December 2001 (public use data fi les). To standardize these total claims for numbers of physicians and people in each state, we used information from the 2000 American Medical Association (AMA) Physician Masterfi le 15 and the 2000 US Decennial Census. 16 We calculated the reported number of medical malpractice payments, total dollar amount payments, mean dollar amount per payment, payments per 1,000 practicing physicians, and payments per 100,000 population. Physician Insurers of Association of America, 18 and American Tort Reform Association. 19 We developed a coding scheme to categorize each state and the District of Columbia by the presence or absence of specifi c malpractice statutory reform. Two teams (one team included an attorney) independently coded state tort reform statutes, and the teams decided on the fi nal coding by consensus.
Bivariate analysis was performed to study associations between malpractice payment rates/payments and physician liability premiums (dependent variables) and 10 common state tort reform statutes (independent variables). These state statutory reforms included total damage caps, noneconomic damage caps, joint liability reform, attorney fee caps, mandatory arbitration, excess coverage funds, permitted periodic payments, collateral source reform, certifi cate of merit requirements, and statute of limitations. Total damage caps are limits on total damages, which include economic damages (ie, medical bills, lost income, direct cost of injury) and noneconomic damages (ie, caps for "pain and suffering"). "Hard" noneconomic damage caps are those without any exceptions; "soft" noneconomic damage caps are those with exceptions (including adjustment for infl ation, exceptions for particular injuries). (Supplemental Appendix 1, available onlineonly at http://www.annfammed.org/cgi/content/ full/4/3/240/DC1, displays a complete list of statute defi nitions.) Because total damage caps showed a consistent and strong relationship across multiple payment characteristics, we controlled for the presence of total damage caps for all statutes that showed signifi cant associations across one or more payment characteristics. We performed a multivariate analysis (with regression equations using each variable individually and then using all variables in combination); this multivariate analysis did not add further explanation to our model of the association between caps, payments, and premiums. Statute variables (other than total and noneconomic damage caps) did not obscure the effects of caps, nor did they add explanation to the model. We therefore report results from the bivariate analysis. We used the source for state medical premium information commonly cited by US General Accounting Offi ce and US Congressional Budget Offi ce and extracted annual premiums for 3 specialties for which information was available: internal medicine, obstetrics, and general surgery. 20 Pearson's coeffi cient was calculated for associations between payment characteristics and premiums. To calculate reductions in liability payments associated with certain statutes, we standardized the rates where we applied payment and premium characteristics of states with a specifi c statute to those states without that statute.
RESULTS

Payments
Wide variations in mean malpractice payment characteristics exist among the states (Table 1 Table 1 , available online-only at http://www.annfammed. org/cgi/content/full/4/3/240/DC1.
When the 10 different state statutory reforms were studied using bivariate analysis, associations were found between 2 reforms-total damage caps and noneconomic damage caps-and payments. Total damage caps were negatively associated with the mean dollar amount per payment, payment per practicing physician, and payment per person in the population ( Table 2 ). The mean dollar amount per payment was 26% lower in those 7 states having total damage caps compared with those 44 states not having total damage caps ($196,495 .34 vs $265,554.50, P = .001). Total (Table 3 ). The average amount per payment was 22% less for those states with noneconomic caps than it was for those states without noneconomic caps ($219,225.98 vs $279,849.86, P = .010). Controlling for the presence of total damage caps, this association remained statistically signifi cant (P = .029). When payments were divided by the state population, the dollar amount per person in the population was onethird less in states having noneconomic caps compared with states not having nonecon omic caps ($28.60 vs $42.02 per person, P = .047). When controlled for total damage caps, these differences in number of payments per person were not statistically signifi cant, P = .226. As with total caps, there was no difference between states with and without noneconomic damage caps in the number of payments made per physician or per person in the population. We then split noneconomic damage caps into hard and soft caps to see whether this distinction mattered. The amount per claim differed signifi cantly between states not having a noneconomic damage cap and those having a hard noneconomic damage cap ($279,849.86 vs $194,543.66; P = .008).
Of the other 8 tort reform statutes, we found that states with periodic payments had higher dollar amounts per payment, and states with excess coverage funds had lower dollar amounts per payment. When controlled for whether a state had total damage caps, however, these associations lost statistical signifi cance.
After rate standardization for mean payment rate and amount, had those 31 states without noneconomic damage caps adopted the payment characteristics of those 20 states with noneconomic damage caps, we estimated a $1.3 billion reduction in malpractice payments during the 3-year period (1999) (2000) (2001) . Likewise, had those 44 states without total damage caps adopted the payment characteristics of those states with total damage caps, we estimated a potential $2.4 billion payment reduction during the 3 years. The estimated reductions during the 3-year period could be $1.0 billion, $2.8 billion, and $5.1 billion if total caps of $1 million, $500K, and $250K, were applied, respectively, to all payments.
Liability Premiums
Bivariate analysis for each of the 10 state statutes and physician malpractice premiums showed the strongest associations between total damage caps and lower premiums (Table 4) . Total damage caps were associated with lower mean annual premiums for all 3 specialties, with obstetricians having the greatest savings ($22,371.57 vs $42,728.68, P <.001). Although undifferentiated noneconomic damage caps showed a trend toward lower physician liability premiums, this trend was not statistically signifi cant (Table 4) . When we further differentiated hard from soft noneconomic damage caps, we found that the premiums for obstetricians varied signifi cantly ($30,283.75 vs $45,740.88; P = .039) ( Table 5) .
If those 44 states without total caps had premium rates of states with total caps, the potential annual premium savings for internists, general surgeons, and obstetricians could be $711 million, $270 million, $815 million, respectively. Likewise, for those 31 states without noneconomic damage caps, the potential annual premium savings for internists, general surgeons, and obstetricians could be $539 million, $127 million, $350 million, respectively. 
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DISCUSSION
This study is the fi rst to use the most comprehensive national medical liability payment data available to investigate the relationships between 10 specifi c state tort statutory reforms and malpractice payments and premiums. For the years 1999 through 2001, total and noneconomic damage caps were associated with lower dollar amounts per payment, confi rming fi ndings from smaller and less-recent studies. [8] [9] [10] An important new fi nding is the association between total caps and lower insurance premiums; there is a suggestion that hard noneconomic damage caps are also associated with lower insurance premiums. This association is not surprising and calls into serious question the argument that recent increases in medical liability premiums are unrelated to payments. Currently, there remains considerable discourse regarding the multiple factors infl uencing the fi nancial losses seen by malpractice carriers (eg, market cycle, claims severity and frequency, investment returns) and associations with rises in premiums. 21 It is important to begin a discussion of limitations of this study by stating the controversies that surround the NPDB. 22 In 2000, the General Accounting Offi ce made recommendations regarding the limitations of the NPDB, especially with regard to its fi ndings of delayed submissions (more than 30-day delays), miscoding of information, lack of information about nonphysician clinicians, and systems' use of the corporate shields to avoid reporting. Our use of aggregate data from a 3-year period minimizes issues around submission delays, we did not use specifi c claims information (subject to coding errors), and we were interested only in payments by physician clinicians. NPDB data represent payments made only on behalf of individual practitioners; therefore, we were unable to include payments made on behalf of corporations (eg, corporate shield technicality) or errors in double reporting. Despite these limitations of the NPDB, it remains the most complete source of payment data available.
None of the tort statutory reforms we studied was associated with lower rates of payments (ie, fewer payments per physician or per population). Because the NPDB is a repository for payments and not claims, claims that do not result in payments are not reported. Accordingly, some reforms may be associated with lower claims rates, an association that cannot be tested using the NPDB. There are instances in which the NPDB may report multiple payments for one claim (ie, by the insurance company as well as a state fund) in those states that have excess coverage funds. To ensure that mean dollar amounts per payment were not falsely decreased in states with excess coverage funds and caps, we repeated the analysis removing all 10 states with excess coverage funds and found that the same relationships between total caps and noneconomic caps and lower mean claim payment remained signifi cant. Likewise, the association between total caps and lower premiums for obstetricians remained signifi cant.
Conclusions of causation must be made cautiously because of complex, interacting, and other unmeasured factors. For example, the nonsignifi cant tendency for states mandating periodic payments to have higher malpractice payments might not mean that this reform leads to higher payments; rather, it might mean that states with high payouts have acknowledged a need to allow defendants to pay large awards over time. The lower payments and premiums in the 7 states that had total caps show a strong association between payments and caps despite a small sample size. Using dichotomous variables to describe other laws with subtle variations and major exceptions, however, may actually bias against fi nding signifi cant associations where they may in fact exist, as any outcome differences are averaged. 23 As a result of this concern, we chose to defi ne and analyze hard and soft noneconomic damage caps separately.
Although other tort reform statutes showed tendencies toward lower payments, signifi cance vanished when we controlled for total damage caps. This fi nding may refl ect an overwhelming effect of total damage caps on payments. Alternatively, as argued in a June 2004 Congressional Budget Offi ce report, analyzing the effects of individual statutes is complicated by an inherent diffi culty in controlling for other unmeasured differences between states; these differences may have important effects on premiums. 24 In fact, Thorpe's recent analysis showed that the presence of caps is associated with lower physician malpractice premiums. 21 Our estimates of payment reductions were limited to the direct savings, probably underestimating the fi nancial impact of caps. Reductions in other indirect costs of litigation could generate considerable savings, as payments represent only a fraction of the total costs of medical liability. 25 Our analysis supports the Congressional Budget Offi ce estimates that tort reforms could increase federal revenues by $3 billion and save $14.9 billion over the next 10 years while reducing physician premiums by 25% to 30%. 26 Given a sample size of 51, this study is at risk of poor power to detect signifi cant associations. We chose to use a traditional standard of 95% certainty but recognize that policy makers may not need such a rigorous standard and may be comfortable with a lower threshold of certainty, in which case other associations between reforms and malpractice payments might bear further scrutiny.
Time lags also presented a limitation; time from statute enactment to effective date varied from immediately to several months, and time from a statute's effective date to actual legal application could be years. Because most statutory reforms in the 1990s were enacted in the few years before 1999, we coded statute enactment as of January 1999 and analyzed payments made during the 3 subsequent years (1999) (2000) (2001) in an effort to capture paid claims most likely affected by the statute. Future analyses could quantify payments and premiums before and after statute enactment to establish trends that may be explained by statute application.
Cost containment is certainly not the only goal of tort reform. The current medical liability tort system has failed clinicians and patients as a mechanism of rational compensation for injury and of improving the quality of care. 27 The wide state-to-state variations in payments imply a lack of equitable compensation for injured patients. Previous studies have substantiated this failing and proposed innovative options for the malpractice tort system to promote justice and improve care. 28 The United States could also learn from international models. In Spain, for example, the medical society and regional health service worked together to institute new systems to provide insurance coverage, professional education, and advice for physicians while continuing to protect and respect the rights of patients. 29 Sweden has a no-fault system, which has been considered a model for US reform. 30 For the United States, the sizable fi nancial savings associated with total and noneconomic damage caps accrue not only to physicians but also to insurers, employers, and patients who ultimately bear these costs. Moving the current policy debates toward fi nding a broader solution to the inequities in our current liability system would mean that reform efforts would include strategies aimed at improving the quality and safety of the health system.
